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Army and Nation by Steven I. Wilkinson is a good read. Painstaking 
research has gone into it, and the book is copiously annotated. Facts, 
as quoted, leave no scope for doubts. The graphic presentation of the 
statistical analysis is attractive, and most, but not all, of the conclusions are valid. It is flattering for a former soldier like me that the Indian Army, 
in which I served for over 37 years, has attracted the attention of one 
more scholar from the First World. 
The author has gone into the most minute details of the ethnicity 
of the soldiers who had been recruited by the Army raised by the East 
India Company, and how and when the British introduced the concept of 
mixing ethnicities at the unit level as a protective device. After the Army 
had been hit by the Mutiny in 1857, in which some units had revolted, 
and others had not, cause and effect relationships between ethnicities 
and loyalty to the British Raj were established. As a result, significant 
changes were brought about in the class compositions of the units by 
the percipient British masters. A revolt by a unit of mixed ethnicities was 
considered unlikely; the differences in ethnicities were expected to act 
as firewalls. Single-class units, from the most ‘reliable’ sections of the 
population of the subcontinent, based on the part that they had played in 
helping the British in quelling the Mutiny, were also raised. The Gurkhas, 
Sikhs, Muslims from the Punjab, and some Muslim tribesmen from the 
border region made the grade. But even they were not fully trusted, and 
a certain proportion of British units was retained in the Army in India. 
Their presence promised swift retribution for those who revolted. With 
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few exceptions, as in the case of the Mountain Artillery batteries, Indians 
were not trusted with guns until 1935. The regiments of the Royal 
Artillery were also meant to act as a deterrent against another revolt. 
As far as the British political leadership and the bureaucracy in India 
were concerned, they had reasons to conclude that the measures taken 
by them after the Mutiny had been effective in preventing a blowback. 
Except for the formation of the Indian National Army by the late Netaji 
Subhas Chandra Bose, there had been no major breaking of bounds. In 
the twilight hour, a lot had changed and the imperial power had also 
thrown in the towel. 
In the wake of the 1857 Mutiny, a strong correlation between 
reliability and mixed class units had firmly been established in the minds 
of the British rulers. Divide et Impera was a strange policy to follow within 
the Army that was trusted to fight loyally against the enemies of Great 
Britain. Over a period of time, the British political class and bureaucracy 
came to believe that their balancing acumen had produced the desired 
results. The truth seems to have eluded them: it was neither the balancing 
act, nor the presence of British troops that had ensured the loyalty and 
fighting efficiency of the Indian units. It was the devotion of the British 
leadership at the unit level that had achieved the desired results. They had 
won the hearts of the Indian troops. 
The Mutiny in 1857, principally, was by the native soldiers against their 
British officers rather than against the Raj per se, although that motive was 
also present in some cases. Good regimental soldiers in the then ruling 
class rightly concluded that it was the failure of leadership at the unit 
level that had mainly led to the revolt; the penny-wise policies of the East 
India Company had also added the fuel to the fire. They concentrated 
on improving the quality of leadership at the unit level. They sent some 
of their best officers to India who totally identified themselves with the 
ethnicities and religions of the troops they commanded, and trained them 
well. Unlike before the Mutiny, the new lot was professionally competent, 
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and went about setting a fine example to the Indian officers and soldiers 
of good military leadership. Many of them forgot the colour of their skin, 
led from the front, and inculcated in their troops the fighting spirit and 
the will to win. 
The internal tensions within the sub-units and ethnicities were turned 
into competition to achieve professional excellence. The example set by 
the officers created the value system that motivated the units to fight to 
the last man and the last round. Wages and allowances were pushed into 
‘lesser considerations’, and the upholding of the ‘name and the izzat’ of 
the unit became the sole purpose of their lives. The response of the troops 
was sincere and overwhelming. 
The machinations of checks and balances, and the exercises in the 
creation of firewalls had been rendered irrelevant. The units, in defiance 
of the suspicions harboured against them by the policy-makers, proved to 
be fully cohesive. There were a few incidents of insubordination or refusal 
to obey orders but the swift corrective action rather than the firewalls 
prevented large scale mutinies.
The Indian units gave a good account of themselves in many 
frontier actions, but the real test came in the Great War when the 
performance of Indian soldiers was startlingly impressive. It became a 
matter of honour for the Indian soldiers to fight shoulder to shoulder 
with the regimental officers. The concept of honour pushed pay and 
allowances into the background. The performance in World War II 
was excellent except for the defection of some prisoners of war to the 
Indian National Army (INA). Those who joined it, belonged to all the 
ethnicities. The so-called checks and balances had fallen. The notion 
that the mixing of ethnicities was a necessary and sufficient condition 
for ensuring loyalty of the Indian the soldiery was not borne out. The 
author mentions the book A Matter of Honour by Philip Mason in the 
bibliography, but his conclusions make one wonder if he absorbed the 
spirit of the book. 
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The first Prime Minister of independent India had doubts if at all 
India needed the Army it had taken over from the British. The Army’s 
raison d’être was a matter of doubt for him. It seems that he did not look 
upon the Army as one of the national assets for ensuring the security 
of the newly independent country. He had persuaded the then Army 
Chief, Gen Thimayya, to withdraw the resignation that he had submitted 
to the government as a result of friction between him and the Defence 
Minister. Later, he thought it fit to show the Army Chief in poor light in 
the Parliament. The entire Army had felt belittled. 
Taking a cue from him, the main concern of the political class 
seemed to have been to keep the Army in its place so that its demands on 
resources were reduced, rather than keeping it in prime condition so that 
it could perform its role. With the willing assistance of the bureaucracy, 
they began the exercise by lowering the status of the Army officers. As a 
good measure, their pay was reduced. Poor remuneration was expected to 
bring about the lowering of living standards, and, in turn, the prestige of 
the Army. In due course, the Army would be reconciled to being on the 
lower rungs of the hierarchy. The inherited suspicions about the reliability 
of the Army could well have been the reasoning for continuing with the 
self same policies governing the class compositions of single class and 
mixed units. The partition did call for adjustments in class compositions; 
therefore, some unavoidable changes had to take place. We have no reason 
to believe that the political class or the bureaucrats feared the possibility 
of coups per se. But their disdain did produce an adverse impact on the 
morale of the Army. No wonder that the Army suffered from neglect. But 
for the jolt of 1962, things would have continued in much the same vein 
until a bigger disaster struck. 
The author gives credit to the political class and bureaucracy for 
having preempted the possibility of a coup d’état in India. For someone 
like me, this is nothing short of blasphemy. Such facile conclusions 
subsume an abiding intent in the minds of the rank and file and the 
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leadership to execute a coup, or coups for that matter. We do not know 
what led the author to believe that the senior leadership of the Army 
ever thought on these lines. There has never been even a whiff of the 
likelihood of a coup in India except in the minds of some imaginative and 
overzealous bureaucrats, and a ‘gifted’ journalist. But even those fears 
were quickly dispelled. Certainly, these ‘non-happenings’ did not warrant 
a conclusion that the Indian Army was prevented from undertaking a 
coup by a vigilant political leadership and astute bureaucracy. There is no 
need for a counter-balancing Border Security Force (BSF) to keep the 
Army in its place. The BSF has its own role, and it performs it well. It is a 
ludicrous idea to believe that the Army is held in check by the BSF in the 
same manner that the British battalions had kept the ‘native’ units away 
from mischief. No, it is the value system, which is the life-breath of the 
Indian Army, that keeps it going even in adverse conditions. Remaining 
within the constitutional bounds is an integral part of this value system. 
It has never been different.
There are two anecdotes that best illustrate the spirit of the senior 
leadership of the Army. Towards the end of the emergency, when 
there were signs of political instability, the Prime Minister had asked 
the late Gen TN Raina about what the Army would be doing in those 
circumstances. He replied that he would abide by the Constitution. The 
late Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw was asked a comparable question 
by the same Prime Minister. He reportedly replied that he would not do 
anything improper, not because it was impossible to do so, but because 
he had no such intentions.
One wonders why the author presumes that coups did not take place 
in India on account of the vigilance of the civil authority? Are coups 
normal unless made impossible or prevented by a slew of measures? Does 
he think that it is normal for all Third World Armies to seize power as a 
matter of course? Or is he equating India with Pakistan? If that is so, it 
would explain quite a lot of his speculation. Yes, there is a lot between 
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India and Pakistan that is alike, and yet there are fundamental differences. 
All Indians, including its defence forces, firmly believe in both democracy 
and the Constitution. The notion of a coup d’état  in India is absurd. For 
the Indian Army, the Service is both a matter of faith and honour: faith in 
the Constitution, and honour in upholding the traditional values of the 
Army at all costs.
The Indian Army would be within its rights to say to the doubters, 
“O ye,  of  l i t t le  fa i th”.
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